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In October 2007, France introduced an exemption on the income
tax and social security contributions that applied to wages received
for hours worked overtime. The goal of the policy was to increase
the number of hours worked. This article shows that this reform
has had no significant impact on hours worked. Conversely, it has
had a positive impact on the overtime hours declared by highly
qualified wage earners, who have opportunities to manipulate the
overtime hours they declare in order to optimize their tax situation
since the hours they work are difficult to verify.
I. Introduction
In France, between October 1, 2007, and July 1, 2012, remuneration
paid for hours worked overtime was exempted from income tax and a
substantial portion of social security contributions both for the employee
and the employer.1 This detaxation was an essential plank of the economic
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1 Following the presidential election of May 2012, this detaxation was entirely
abolished for firms with more than 20 employees starting July 1, 2012. After this
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policy introduced after the presidential elections of May 2007. For France’s
new president, detaxation of overtime hours sounded the death knell of
the Malthusian culture symbolized by the 35-hour workweek, the impact
on employment of which was open to legitimate doubt.2 The tax exemp-
tion on overtime hours looked like the ideal instrument for injecting dy-
namism into the French economy by giving an incentive to “work more
to earn more.”
In recent years, other European countries have adopted similar reforms
in order to boost hours worked. Since 1996, Austria has exempted the ex-
tra rate paid for overtime from income tax, with a maximum of 10 hours
per month. In Belgium, taxes and social security contributions on the extra
overtime rate have been reduced since 2005.3 Italy introduced a similar
measure in 2008 but suspended it at the close of that year in the face of
rising unemployment. Finally, Luxembourg has had in place exemptions
from tax and social security payments for hours of paid work beyond the
legal limit since the start of 2008.4 While none of these countries have un-
dertaken a reform as far-reaching as that of France, the view that detax-
ation of overtime hours is an effective means of increasing the number of
hours worked appears to have convinced a significant number of policy
makers in Europe. This idea is also beginning to spread in the United
States, where some politicians propose eliminating the income tax on over-
time pay.5 Although detaxation of overtime hours is becoming popular
among policy makers, it has never been evaluated as far as we know. The
aim of our article is to contribute to filling this gap.
2 See Artus, Cahuc, and Zylberberg ð2007Þ and Chemin and Wasmer ð2009Þ.
3 In Belgium, there has been a reduction of fiscal costs on the first 65 overtime
hours per calendar year since July 1, 2005.This ceilingwas raised to thefirst 100 hours
for the year 2009, and since January 1, 2010, it is set at 130 hours. The advantage for
the employee consists of a tax reduction, and for the employer it is in reduced social
contributions on the extra rate for overtime hours. Hence, an important difference
between the French and Belgian mechanisms is that the compulsory rate of tax de-
duction on overtime hours is at least as high as that on normal hours in Belgium,
since the tax exemption applies only to the extra overtime rate, whereas in France it
is the total remuneration for overtime hours, not just the extra rate, to which the
exemption applies.
4 In Luxembourg, from January 1, 2008, the base rate of remuneration for over-
time hours ðbut not the extra rateÞ was no longer subject to income tax. Since Jan-
uary 1, 2009, the entire remuneration for overtime hours is exempt from tax and an
exemption for social security contributions has been introduced, but only up to
a limit of an overtime extra rate of 40%.
5 See, e.g., the proposition of a governorship candidate in Iowa ðhttp://www
.youtube.com/watch?v5BFKLqc7fCe8Þ and the petition launched on rallycongress
.com.
date, a small relief on employers’ social contributions of €0.5 per overtime hour
remains only for firms with fewer than 20 employees.
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Economic analysis stresses that if taxation is to be efficient, it must
define a tax base that the authorities can easily verify.6 Now, in most cases,
it is hard for a third party to verify the number of hours worked when
employers and employees have a shared interest in not revealing it. And
that is indeed the case with the tax exemption on overtime hours: em-
ployers and wage earners have a shared interest in paying and receiving
as much remuneration as possible in the form of overtime hours, in or-
der to benefit from the tax cut, without necessarily increasing the length
of time actually worked. Opportunities to do so are many, since it is very
hard for the fiscal authorities to check on how much time was really
worked when the employee and the employer concert their declaration
of an amount. This is the Achilles’s heel of detaxation of overtime hours.
This suggests that the impact of detaxation of overtime hours on hours
effectively worked depends in large part on the verifiability of overtime
hours. Hence, it is far from obvious that detaxation of overtime hours,
costly in any case,7 leads directly to an increase in hours worked.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the average weekly number of paid
overtime hours for the period 2003–9.8 We see that paid overtime hours
are more numerous after the introduction of the reform in 2007 than be-
fore. The level of paid overtime hours rose in 2007 and has remained rel-
atively high since, while the economy was entering a deep recession.9
6 This is so especially since the works of JamesMirrlees ð1971Þ and Agnar Sandmo
ð1981Þ. For a recent overview of this topic, see Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez ð2009Þ.
7 The official cost for 2008 is estimated at €4.4 billion, which represents the
equivalent of 40% of the total budget of the French state for employment ðhttp://
www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/alaune/loi-faveur-heures-supplementaires-quel
-bilan.htmlÞ.
8 We utilize the ongoing Enqueˆte Emploi ðLabor Force SurveyÞ, which seeks
information from persons throughout the year and which began in January 2003.
Before that date, the Enqueˆte Emploi was based on interrogations that took place
during the month of March every year. The data on overtime hours are not per-
fectly homogeneous over the span 2003–9, because persons who had not changed
jobs since theprevious interrogationwereonlyaskedabout their hours exceeding the
maximum during the first two interrogations ðeach person is queried once per tri-
mester for 6 consecutive trimestersÞ. Since the fourth trimester of 2006, questions
about the number of overtime hours are asked at every interrogation. We have
systematically verified that our results, derived from data covering the whole pe-
riod 2003T1–2009T3, retain their validity for the subperiod 2006T4–2009T3.
9 This increase in paid overtime hours might result from changed behavior in
compiling tax declarations, prompted by the introduction of detaxation. In fact,
surveys carried out on firms have revealed that a significant percentage of firms
in which the workweek habitually exceeded 35 hours did not declare overtime
hours prior to October 2007. This proportionmay have shrunk after October 2007
ðChagny, Gonzales, and Zilberman 2010Þ. The Enqueˆte Emploi does not allow
us to detect a significant growth of overtime hours linked to this type of behavior.
We can ascertain it by studying the evolution of the declarations of paid over-
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The increase in paid overtime hours beginning in 2007 observed in fig-
ure 1 is not necessarily linked to the reform.10 It might result from a more
intensive utilization of overtime hours by firms that were avoiding hiring
in anticipation of the onset of a recession. Moreover, even if the increase
in overtime hours is indeed linked to the reform, it is possible that it did
not entail a rise in hours actually worked. This scenario is plausible to the
extent that a significant percentage of overtime hours worked is not ex-
plicitly remunerated.11 Prior to October 2007, employees whose labor con-
10 Other statistical sources confirm this increase in paid overtime hours in 2007
ðChagny et al. 2010Þ.
time hours of persons who declare they work 39 hours both before and after Oc-
tober 2007. On average, a person who works 39 hours declares 0.09 paid overtime
hours per week ðwith a standard deviation equal to 0.02Þ before October 2007 and
0.12 hours from October 2007 on ðwith a standard deviation equal to 0.01Þ. The
p-value linked to the null hypothesis of an equality of overtime hours before and
after October 2007 is equal to 20%.
FIG. 1.—Average number per quarter of paid overtime hours per full-time em-
ployee; nonagricultural for-profit sector. SOURCE: Enqueˆte Emploi.
11 The underdeclaration of overtime hours is a phenomenon observed in other
countries. Shulamit Kahn and Carlos Mallo ð2007Þ have estimated, for the United
States, a model where employers and employees may have a shared interest in not
declaring overtime hours to the authorities because of the costs associated with
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tract stipulated a weekly duration of 35 hours were working 37 hours on
average and were declaring only 0.4 paid overtime hours per week.12 If the
regulations governing hours worked had been rigorously respected, there
ought to have been 2 paid hours per week.13 Moreover, if the regulations
had been followed to the letter, the correlation between the paid overtime
hours and the hours worked by employees whose labor contract stipulates
a workweek of 35 hours ought to be close to one. Before October 2007,
however, it came to 0.39.14 In substance, paid overtime hours and length
of time worked frequently vary independently, and it is not at all obvious
that an increase in paid overtime hours has direct repercussions on the du-
ration of work.
In order to evaluate the impact of the detaxation, we compare the
evolution of the paid overtime hours and the hours worked of two groups
of individuals, one of which is affected by the reform and the other which
is not. The treatment group is composed of employees who reside and
work in France. The untreated group is composed of employees who re-
side in France but commute regularly and work abroad in regions adjoin-
ing the French border. These transborder workers ðtravailleurs frontal-
iers, literally “border workers”Þ did not benefit from the detaxation of
overtime hours. Hence, the overtime hours and hours worked of French
employees who work in regions near those of the transborder workers
ought to rise relative to those of the transborder workers, from the fourth
quarter of 2007 on, if the reform really did have the effects anticipated and
if other events did not modify the relative hours of the two groups of em-
ployees. In order to ensure the pertinence of the results obtained, we take
into account the differences in economic situation between countries and
the evolution of regulatory frameworks on both sides of the borders. We
compare the evolution of the duration of work and overtime hours for the
12 Here we take into consideration employees in the nonagricultural for-profit
sector whose labor contract stipulates a workweek of 35 hours and who do not
declare overtime hours offset by compensating rest time. The period assessed is
2003T1–2007T3, in other words, before the introduction of the reform.
13 This does not necessarily mean that these hours are not paid. The monthly
wage may include such hours as a result of an agreement between employee and
employer not stipulated in the labor contract. Such hours may also be remunerated
in the form of a performance bonus, despite such a bonus being forbidden and
subject to judicial sanction.
14 Again, we consider employees in the nonagricultural for-profit sector whose
labor contract stipulates a workweek of 35 hours and who do not declare overtime
hours offset by compensating rest time. The period assessed is 2003T1–2007T3, in
other words, before the introduction of the reform.
entering overtime hours in the accounts and with the interpretation of the legal
rules. The underdeclaration of overtime hours in Germany is documented by Thomas
Bauer and Klaus Zimmerman ð1999Þ. David Bell and Robert Hart ð1999Þ highlight
a significant volume of unpaid overtime hours in the United Kingdom.
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same ensemble of workers before and after the reform, thus neutralizing
any bias due to an eventual alteration of the composition of the groups. We
also checked that other measures introduced at the same time as the de-
taxation of overtime hours, notably an income tax credit on mortgage in-
terests and tax relief for inheritance and donations, did not affect the con-
trol and treated groups differently.
Ultimately, we find that the overtime hours of employees working in
France rose, relative to those of the transborder employees, starting in the
fourth quarter of 2007. This rise in overtime hours applies solely to highly
qualified employees, who have many ways to manipulate the overtime
hours they declare in order to achieve tax optimization because the length
of time they work is particularly difficult to check on. Conversely, we
detect no difference in the evolution of hours worked, whatever category
of employee is considered. These results suggest that the upshot of the
detaxation of overtime hours has essentially been tax optimization, with
no real impact on the length of time worked. These results are confirmed
using an alternate strategy. This time we compare the evolution of the
duration of work by employees in very small firms, who benefited from
the detaxation, and that of independent workers in similar sectors, who
have not been directly affected by the detaxation of overtime hours.
Again, we detect no difference in the evolution of hours worked across the
two groups.
This article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the content of the
regulations governing length of time worked and that of the reform of
October 2007, which introduced detaxation of overtime hours. Section III
is devoted to a theoretical discussion of the consequences of detaxation of
overtime hours. We start by presenting a model that shows that detaxation
of overtime hours does increase the length of time worked if the hours are
perfectly verifiable, since the enhanced remuneration of overtime hours
induced by the detaxation incentivates employees to work more. This is
the objective of the reform. Yet, when the hours are totally unverifiable,
detaxation of overtime hours leads to a diminution of the length of time
worked, for it is possible to increase one’s income by declaring fictive
hours; this increase in income incentivates employees to work fewer hours
if leisure is a normal good, a generally accepted hypothesis. Thus, in the
intermediate case, pertinent from an empirical viewpoint, in which hours
are imperfectly verifiable by the authorities, detaxation of overtime hours
should have an ambiguous impact on length of time worked. Section IV
describes the evolution of the declared overtime hours and the hours
worked of employees for the period 2003–9 in order to highlight the
specificity of this evolution in October 2007. Section V compares the evo-
lution of the overtime hours and the length of time worked of individuals
affected, and ones not affected, by the detaxation of overtime hours. Some
concluding observations are offered in Section VI.
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II. The Regulation of the Duration of Work and
the Detaxation of Overtime Hours
A. Regulation of the Duration of Work before October 2007
Since January 1, 2000, France has lived with the 35-hour workweek
regime,15 as opposed to 39 hours previously. But the regulations governing
time spent at work go far beyond the specification of the legal limit on
work time. They comprise numerous mechanisms that form a complex
ensemble of constraints and limits on the length of time effectively worked.
Two of these are particularly important. They concern overtime hours and
the annual lump sum of days.
By definition, every hour of work performed beyond the legal limit of
35 hours per week is an overtime hour. Until October 1, 2007, this entitled
the worker to an increase in his or her remuneration varying between min-
imums of 10% to 50% of the normal hourly wage, according to the size of
the firm ð10% minimum in firms with at most 20 employees, 25% mini-
mum beyond thatÞ, the sectoral agreements in place ðwhich might dictate
more favorable ratesÞ, and the number of hours worked ða minimum in-
crease of 50% once past the threshold of 8 overtime hours per weekÞ. But
working time could also be reckoned on an annual rather than a weekly
basis. By agreements in place at the level of the sector, the firm, or the
establishment, certain employees fall under a “modulated” regime, inwhich
the duration of work may vary over all or part of the year but may not
exceed 1,607 hours. Within this framework, hours worked in excess of
this ceiling are considered overtime hours.
A range of mechanisms restricts the use of overtime hours. In the first
place, the legislation provides for maximum durations of work: 10 hours
per day ð8 hours for night work and 12 hours maximum under a collective
agreementÞ and 48 hours per week ðwithout exceeding 44 hours on av-
erage over a period of 12 consecutive weeksÞ. The principal mechanism is
the annual quota, the volume of which is fixed at 220 hours by decree but
which can be modified by a collective sectoral agreement and also by an
agreement at the firm or plant level under certain conditions. The em-
ployer is required, in principle, to inform the inspector of labor and to
obtain his permission on a case-by-case basis to have overtime hours per-
formed in excess of the quota. Overtime hours also create an entitlement
to a complex system of rest time, which in substance provides for extra
holidays as a function of overtime hours worked: on the one hand, if a
sectoral agreement provides for it, remuneration for overtime hoursmay be
replaced by a compensatory rest period of equivalent length ðand in this
15 The date January 1, 2000, applied to firms with 20 employees or more; for the
others, the 35-hour rule was imposed starting on January 1, 2002 ðart. L.3121-10 of
the labor codeÞ.
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case the overtime hours do not count toward the annual quotaÞ; on the
other hand, once the quota is exceeded, obligatory compensation is trig-
gered in the form of a rest period equaling 50% of the duration of the
hours worked in firms of 20 employees or less and 100% in firmswithmore
than 20 employees ðand 50% above the threshold of 41 hours or moreÞ.
Faced with such constraints, many employers prefer to pay “premiums”
or “bonuses,” which are often remuneration for undeclared overtime hours.
Labor ministry investigations regularly reveal that the quantity of overtime
hours really being worked is unknown.
In addition, in 2007, certain employees were governed by the ar-
rangement specifying an annual lump sum of days. These were managers
or nonmanagerial employees who enjoyed real autonomy in how they
managed their time. In this case, a collective agreement covering a sector,
a firm, or an establishment determined the number of days worked. Ab-
sent such an agreement, the upper limit of the lump sum is set by default
at 218 days per year.
B. The Detaxation of Overtime Hours Introduced in October 2007
Thus in essence the regulation of working time in 2007 was charac-
terized by a legal duration of 35 hours per week and by stringent limits on
the utilization of overtime hours. The law “to promote work, employ-
ment, and purchasing power” ðtravail, emploi, pouvoir d’achat; hence “the
TEPA law” or “the fiscal package law”Þ, adopted on August 1, 2007,
abolished none of the regulatory and administrative mechanisms limiting
the use of overtime hours. All the law did is alter their cost, fromOctober 1,
2007, on. In the first place, the TEPA law renders the rate of extra re-
muneration for overtime hours uniform, setting it at 25%, whatever the
size of the firm ðabsent extended sectoral collective agreements or ones at
the firm level providing for a different rateÞ. This uniformization entailed
an increase in the cost of an overtime hour for many firms with fewer than
21 employees, for which the rate of extra pay for overtime had previously
been 10%. To offset this extra cost, flat-rate reductions in the social se-
curity contributions paid by employers on overtime hours were intro-
duced: €1.5 per hour in firms with at most 20 employees and €0.5 for the
rest. Next, the overtime hours performed by a private-sector or public-
sector employee were exempted from income tax and wage-based so-
cial security contributions ðup to a limit of 21.5% of the gross wageÞ. The
TEPA law was clearly intended to make the utilization of overtime hours
attractive, especially for employees. Indeed, for workers only, overtime
hours after the reform would yield 30%–50% more, after income tax,
while for firms the impact on labor cost would be smaller and heter-
ogenous depending on the number of employees and the wage level ðsee
app.AÞ. The overall marginal tax rate on overtime hours decreases strongly
in all cases after the reform.
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III. The Consequences of Detaxation: Some Theoretical Remarks
Prior to the TEPA law, the constraints that limited overtime hours led
many employers to reward overtime work with premiums. With the tax
burden on overtime removed, employers have an interest in abandoning
this practice and paying for overtime hours, since that is a way to pay less
tax. Detaxation of overtime hours may then lead to an increase in hours
declared with no change in the length of time effectively worked. Previous
studies by Dora Costa ð2000Þ and Stephen Trejo ð2003Þ show that in-
creases in the rate of extra pay for overtime hours have no or little effect on
the length of working time. The reason is that employers and employees
focus on the overall “package,” in which what counts is the sum total of
hours worked and the total remuneration received, whatever its terms.
This suggests that the impact of detaxation of overtime hours on hours
effectively worked depends in large part on the verifiability of overtime
hours, as we shall now show.
To show how the verifiability of hours worked affects the impact of
detaxation of overtime hours on the length of time worked, we consider a
labor market with workers of heterogeneous productivity. The produc-
tivity of a worker is measured by the parameter v > 0, the distribution of
which is not degenerated in a single point of mass. A worker of produc-
tivity v produces a quantity vf ðHÞ; fð0Þ5 0, f 0 > 0; f 00 < 0;when he works
for duration H. The workers have identical preferences, represented by a
utility function UðC, LÞ, quasi-concave and strictly increasing in relation
to its two arguments: consumption C and leisure L, equal to total dis-
posable time, L0, reduced by the duration worked ðL5 L0 2HÞ. For the
sake of simplicity, wage is the sole source of income for the workers, and
taxable income, denoted by RT, is taxed at a constant rate, denoted by t ∈
ð0, 1Þ. The taxable income is equal to the gross income, denoted by R,
minus the amount that can be deducted from the compensation of over-
time hours.16 We denote this amount by j for each overtime hour, so that
RT 5 R2 jmaxðH 2 H; 0Þ, where H stands for the legal duration of
work. The disposable income, equal to consumption, is equal to R 2 tRT.
Overtime hours are paid by the employer to the employee at rate ð11 pÞw,
where p ≥ 0 is the legal proportional increase in the rate of pay for over-
time hours. We are situated within a framework of partial equilibrium,
which leaves out the impact of how the subsidies on overtime hours are
financed.
We consider a labor market where competing firms offer contracts stip-
ulating an hourly wage and a length of time to be worked. At labor mar-
ket equilibrium, the contracts maximize the utility of employees under the
16 We begin by considering the case where it does not make any difference
whether it is firms or employees who pay taxes because wages are flexible and the
labor market is competitive. The case where wages are rigid is discussed below.
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constraint of null profit for firms. The allocation thus obtained is a Pareto
optimum.
It is helpful to take two diametrically opposed cases in turn: in the
first, overtime hours are perfectly verifiable by the authorities, and, in the
second, they are totally unverifiable. The second case is the one habitu-
ally envisaged in the literature treating optimal taxation in the wake of
the seminal contribution of Mirrlees ð1971Þ: the overall remuneration
received by the employee is assumed to be verifiable, but the number of
hours worked is not. In this framework, productivity v is private infor-
mation held by the firm and the employee and cannot be verified by third
parties.
A. Verifiable Hours Worked
We assume that hours worked are verifiable by the authorities. De-
noting the hourly wage by w, the labor cost has the expression
wH 1 pwmaxðH 2 H; 0Þ:
Assuming that their wage is the sole source of income for the workers,
consumption is equal to the total wage received by the employee net of
taxes,
wH 1 pwmaxðH 2 H; 0Þ2 t wH 1 pw2 jð ÞmaxðH 2 H; 0Þ :
For each type of worker v; the duration of work and the equilibrium
wage maximize utility under the null profit constraint, which is written as
vf ðHÞ5wH 1 pwmaxðH 2 H; 0Þ:
Using the last two relations, it is apparent that the consumption of an
employee of productivity v may be written as
Cðv;HÞ5 vf ðHÞ2 t vf ðHÞ2 jmaxðH 2 H; 0Þ :
In consequence, the equilibrium duration of work for workers of pro-
ductivity v maximizes
U Cðv;HÞ;L0 2H½ :
It is immediately clear that tax exemptions on overtime hours can in-
crease hours worked because they reduce the tax rate on marginal hours
when workers work more than the legal duration of work. Actually, in the-
ory, the tax exemption has an ambiguous impact on the length of time
worked: it causes an income effect, which may dominate the substitu-
tion effect. But in practice this income effect is weak to the extent that the
volume of overtime hours is itself generally weak in relation to total vol-
ume of hours worked. In consequence, it is likely that the substitution
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effect dominates and that overall the subsidy has a positive impact on
hours worked.
So far, we have addressed the case where wages are flexible. If wages
are downward rigid, hours are determined by labor demand, represented
by the null profit constraint. In that case, detaxation of overtime hours
increases hours worked only if it reduces taxes paid by employers. Hence,
overall, when overtime hours are verifiable, detaxation of overtime hours
is likely to have a positive impact on hours worked.
B. Unverifiable Hours Worked
We now assume that the overall remuneration of the worker is verifi-
able but that the quantity of hours worked is not. Let us denote by ~H the
number of hours declared by employees to the authorities.
The ðverifiableÞ labor cost becomes
w ~H 1 pwmaxð ~H 2 H; 0Þ:
The null profit condition yields
vf ðHÞ5w ~H 1 pwmaxð ~H 2 H; 0Þ:
Consequently, the consumption of an employee of productivity v is equal
to the total wage received by the employee net of taxes:
Cðv;HÞ5 vf ðHÞ2 tvf ðHÞ2 jmaxð ~H 2 H; 0Þ:
It is immediately apparent that increasing the number of declared hours
above the legal duration of work allows the employee to pay less tax. To
maximize the subsidy they receive, employees and employers then have
an interest in stating the highest possible number of overtime hours com-
patible with the maximum authorized duration of work, or with a ceiling
duration, beyond which fictive overtime hours could be detected by the
authorities. In France, in most firms, the legal annual quota of 220 hours
is an upper limit, meaning that the maximal amount of fictive hours that
could be reported every week is about 4 hours, notably for those who do
not work any real overtime hours. An increase in the subsidy for overtime
hours is equivalent to an increase in nonwage income, independent of
hours worked, the impact of which on the length of time worked is neg-
ative if leisure is a normal good, which is generally the case.17 Hence, when
17 Notice that the tax on marginal hours does not depend on the subsidy j be-
cause the tax function is linear. When the tax function is not linear, the sign of the
impact of the subsidy on the marginal tax rate depends on the sign of the second
derivative of the tax function. Since most taxes are linear or piecewise linear, it
makes sense to assume linear tax functions from an empirical perspective.
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overtime hours are unverifiable, it is likely that detaxation of overtime
hours has a negative impact on hours worked.
This result, obtained when the hourly wage is perfectly flexible, remains
valid in the presence of a floor under the hourly wage.18 Nonetheless, the
presence of an hourly wage floor may impose a supplementary limit on
the length of time worked that can be declared to the authorities, since
they, knowing the total remuneration, can verify that the declared length
of time worked does indeed correspond to an hourly wage higher than
the authorized floor. So the presence of a wage floor limits the opportu-
nities for tax optimization when hours worked are unverifiable. At the
limit, for employees paid the minimum legal or conventional wage, there
is no margin for maneuver to reduce the hourly wage and detaxation of
overtime hours gives rise to no optimization. This situation corresponds
to the case studied above, where the minimum wage is binding and hours
are verifiable. On the whole, these lines of reasoning show that the impact
of the detaxation of overtime hours on the effective length of time worked
depends largely on the verifiability of time worked, which varies with cat-
egories of workers, and also on the degree of wage rigidity, which generally
varies with wage level.
IV. The Data
We use the Labor Force Survey ðEnqueˆte EmploiÞ carried out by INSEE
ðthe French national institute of statisticsÞ. Each quarter, around 70,000 per-
sons ðresiding in 45,000 residencesÞ are queried, which represents a sam-
pling rate of residences of around 1/600th. This survey is ongoing. Every
person ðolder than age 15Þ in each residence selected is queried once per
quarter for 6 consecutive quarters.
The Enqueˆte Emploi is the sole coherent source currently available for
analyzing the impact of the detaxation of overtime hours. For one thing, it
tracks the duration of time worked continuously since 2003. For another,
the queries regarding the length of time worked are very detailed.19 Over-
time hours worked during the week preceding each interview are declared
at the time of the interview, and the distinction is made between those that
are remunerated and those that are compensated by rest days; total hours
worked are also recorded, and information is supplied about all kinds of
holidays or absences that might have affected the volume; many char-
acteristics of the wage earner ðage, family situation, region, education, job
18 Note that the model has some interesting predictions on the reactions of
hourly wages. These are not analyzed further here because there are large mea-
surement errors on hourly wages in the Enqueˆte Emploi that we use in the em-
pirical part of the article.
19 They are presented in app. B.
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held, type of labor contract, payment of premiums, etc.Þ and of the firm
for which he or she works are also included in the survey ðespecially the
size of the firm and the sector in which it is activeÞ.20
We have selected individuals having a full-time paid job in the nonag-
ricultural for-profit sector, with a work duration less than 70 hours per
week, whose work schedules have not been interrupted by a strike, by time
off for training, by illness, by a period of partial unemployment, by a busi-
ness closure, or by maternity. We have eliminated employees who work un-
der the lump-sum-of-days regime, as most managers do. For this category,
it is not so much the weekly duration of work that is sensitive to detaxation
as it is the total number of days worked during the year. We have likewise
eliminated persons working under a modulation agreement, or one of an-
nualized working time, for whom the length of time worked may tempo-
rarily exceed the legal durationwithout triggering overtime hours.Wehave
excluded the unemployed and the retired ðwho may sometimes have had
some paid activity during the reference week of the surveyÞ, interns, and
persons with contracts supported in the context of some employment pol-
icy, as well as salaried executives, seasonal workers, and those working for
individual employers whose schedules fall under very specific constraints.
20 Other administrative sources issuing from administrative declarations or sur-
veys of heads of firms include information on overtime hours since the fourth quar-
ter of 2007. Examples include the annual declarations of company data ðDADSÞ
and the recapitulatory statement of social security contributions ðBRCÞ filled out
by firmsmonthly or trimestrially when social security contributions are paid. These
two sources have been compiled starting with the fourth quarter of 2007 in order
to follow in detail the paid overtime hours ðfor the DADSÞ or to deduct the reduc-
tion of social security contributions to which firms and employees are entitled on
overtime hours starting on that date ðfor the BRCÞ. But, however reliable they
may be, they contain no information on periods prior to October 2007, and they
therefore cannot serve as a basis for the evaluation of the mechanism introduced
by the TEPA law. As for surveys of firms, such as the Acemo ðActivite´ et conditions
d’emploi de la main d’oeuvreÞ and Ecmoss ðCouˆt de la main d’oeuvre et la structure
des salaires, available from 2005 on for overtime hoursÞ, they constitute the instru-
ment for tracking overtime hours until 2007. However, the information only covers
firms of 10 employees or more ðaround 80% of the nonagricultural for-profit sec-
torÞ. Now the recent measurements of overtime hours have demonstrated that re-
course to them evolves with the size of the firm, whichmakes it difficult to infer the
behavior of very small firms. Moreover, these surveys tend to be affected by un-
derdeclaration, especially on the part of firms resorting to overtime hours with great
regularity. Such firms have had a strong incentive to declare their hours when sur-
veyed starting in October 2007, so as not to reveal any discrepancy with the state-
ments of social security contributions that permit them to benefit from detax-
ation. On these matters, see the “Report to Parliament” on the putting into effect
of article 1 of the law of August 21, 2007, to promote work, employment, and pur-
chasing power relative to the exemptions from charges on overtime hours ðhttp://
www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/094000050/index.shtmlÞ.
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Our analysis of the impact of the reform is focused on transborder
workers and individuals working in France near the northern and eastern
borders, and it deals only with individuals queried before and after Oc-
tober 2007,21 as explained in more detail below. These restrictions allow
us to have 31,054 observations, of which 4,509 are for individuals work-
ing and living in France near the northern and eastern borders and 745 are
for individuals working abroad near these regions but living in France.
Figure 2 shows how these observations are spread along the French
border.
It appears that paid overtime hours are on average worked by men to a
greater extent than by women, by employees under age 50 more than by
seniors, and more often among laborers and the intermediate professions
than among managers and white-collar employees ðsee app. D, which
displays descriptive statistics for the individuals queried before and after
October 2007Þ. Among persons who declare their wage level, it is espe-
21 Individuals queried both before and after October 2007 were queried from
the third quarter of 2006 at the earliest and up to the end of 2008 at the latest, since
they are followed for 18 months in the Labor Force Survey.
FIG. 2.—Number of observations for people working in France in every de-
partment near the northern and eastern French borders ðlight grayÞ and for in-
dividuals working abroad ðtransborder workers, dark grayÞ.
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cially in the vicinity of the median wage ðequaling around 1.6 times the
minimum wageÞ that the weekly averages of overtime hours are highest.
V. The Impact of the Reform
To pinpoint the impact of the detaxation of overtime hours, we com-
pare the evolution of the paid overtime hours and the hours worked for
two groups of individuals, one that is affected by the reform and the other
that is not. Our first strategy for pinpointing the impact of the reform
consists of a comparison between transborder employees, those who re-
side in France but work abroad in bordering regions, and employees who
reside and work in France near the border. We start by discussing this
strategy and then go on to present the results.
In the next stage, we use an alternative identification strategy, where we
focus on individuals working in France: we compare the evolution of the
duration of work of independent workers who do not employ anyone,
and thus are not affected by detaxation, with that of employees who work
in very small firms.
A. Transborder Employees and Employees Working in France
Unlike employees who live and work in France, transborder workers
have not benefited from the detaxation of overtime hours. So the overtime
hours and the hours worked of French employees ought to rise relative to
those of transborder workers, beginning in the fourth quarter of 2007, if
the reform really did have the effects anticipated and if other events have
not altered the relative hours of the two groups of employees.
Let us first provide some details about taxes and social contributions
paid by employees who live and work in France and transborder workers.
The detaxation of overtime hours effectively concerns a portion of social
security contributions and income tax. Employees working in a neighbor-
ing country pay their social security contributions there ðEuropean Com-
munity regulation no. 1408/71, dated June 14, 1971Þ, and thus they do not
benefit from the reduction in social security contributions on overtime
hours, which represents over three-quarters of the total amount of the
exemption. Hence, the detaxation of overtime hours always entails a more
significant reduction of compulsory withholdings for employees working
in France than for transborder workers.
As for the income tax, which represents one-quarter of the tax relief, it is
paid in France if the employee has the fiscal status of travailleur frontalier
ðtransborder workerÞ, meaning he or she resides not far from the border
and returns home sufficiently often ðwith the exception of personsworking
in Luxembourg or in the canton of Geneva who pay their taxes abroadÞ.
Transborder workers who pay their income tax in France only received
confirmation that they could benefit from the detaxation of overtime
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hours at mid-2009 at the earliest ði.e., after the end of our sampleÞ, after
the minister for the budget answered a question from a member of par-
liament.22 Indeed, since October 2007, the tax code has not mentioned
transborder workers in the scope of detaxation because the very definition
ofovertimehoursworked abroaddiffered across countries andwas unclear,
as well as the way to declare these hours. Hence, there was no way trans-
borderworkers could knowwhen and how they could eventually claim the
tax relief until this indeterminacywas explicitly cleared up, whichwas only
done by a circular of January 2010 ðBulletin officiel des impoˆts no. 7, Jan-
uary 14, 2010Þ following the decision of the minister. This circular states
that the benefit of the detaxation applies to transborder workers begin-
ning onOctober 1, 2007. In any case, even if some transborders anticipated
that this law would apply eventually, they would still have been in a dif-
ferent situation from workers in France since they pay social contributions
abroad.
Even if transborder workers did not benefit from detaxation of over-
time hours until January 2010, a range of events might affect the paid over-
time hours and the hours worked of the two groups, independently of the
detaxation of overtime hours, as follows.
ðiÞThe transborder workers might differ from those whowork in France.
These differences might have to do not just with observable character-
istics,23 like educational level, age, or family situation, but also with non-
observable ones, like motivation to work or personal ambition. Such dif-
ferences can lead to different reactions to the economic situation and
diverging evolutions in the duration of work and overtime hours. The
Enqueˆte Emploi, which collects information on every individual for 6 con-
secutive quarters, allows us to take into account the heterogeneity of ob-
servable and nonobservable characteristics, constant over time, among
transborder workers and workers in France, by estimating the impact of
the reform with regresssions that include fixed individual effects. Sum-
mary statistics of observable characteristics in both groups are presented
in appendix F.
ðiiÞ The economic situation might be different in France and in neigh-
boring countries. To take this phenomenon into account, we integrate var-
iables measuring the economic situation in each country, and we compare
the hours of transborder workers with those of employees working in de-
partments ðadministrative-territorial unitsÞofFrance adjacent to theFrench
border, in order to compare employees working in homogeneous geo-
graphic zones. We focus on individuals working in the North and North-
22 Response of the minister to the “Question orale sans de´bat” no. 707 asked by
Mr. Francis Hillmeyer, De´pute´ of the Haut-Rhin department ðJO de l’Assemble´e
Nationale, June 3, 2009, 4773Þ.
23 These characteristics are presented in table F1.
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east of France and transborders working in Belgium, Luxembourg, Ger-
many, and Switzerland.We omit Italy and Spain because there are very few
transborder workers in these countries.24
ðiiiÞ Fiscal reforms might influence the overtime hours and the hours
worked in the bordering countries. Such reforms might have an impact
on the length of time worked of persons residing in France who work
abroad. This might be the case when social security contributions, sys-
tematically paid in the country where the job is held, are modified. This
might also be the case for persons working in Luxembourg or in the canton
of Geneva, for in these cases taxes are paid in the country where the job is
held. We have verified that no reform introduced in a neighboring country
has led to a reduction in obligatory withholdings on hours of work in excess
of the legal or conventional duration of work as significant as in France.
ðivÞ The composition of the two groups of workers might evolve over
time, especially in a period of recession. The Enqueˆte Emploi allows us to
resolve this problem, since it collects information on every individual dur-
ing 6 consecutive quarters. It is therefore possible to compare the evolu-
tion of the duration of work and overtime hours for the same ensemble of
workers before and after the reform, thus neutralizing any bias due to an
eventual alteration of the composition of the groups. In order to make sure
that variations in the length of time worked and overtime hours do not arise
from job changes, we check the robustness of the results by restricting
ourselves to a sample of individuals who kept the same job.25
ðvÞ The TEPA law included several other tax measures that could have
influenced working time behaviors differently across groups: an income
tax credit on mortgage interest, a tax relief for inheritance and donation
ðto childrenÞ, a lower tax on wealth, and a lower threshold for the so-called
tax shield ðsee app. C for a detailed presentation of these measuresÞ. These
new tax breaks could have decreased working time, thus counteracting
the impact of detaxation of overtime. This could be a problem in evalu-
ating the impact of the detaxation of overtime hours if these breaks af-
fected significantly and differently the control and treated groups. A close
scrutiny of these additional measures reveals that this cannot be the case.
• First, all these measures applied equally to those working in France
and to transborders ðwho pay their income and inheritance taxes in
FranceÞ.
24 There are only six observations for transborders working in Italy and six
observations for transborders working in Spain.
25 This choice also excludes individuals who change jobs across countries, which
could potentially affect the evaluation of the reform. However, in our sample only
six individuals changed the country where they work over the corresponding pe-
riod.
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• Second, as shown in appendix C, these additional measures con-
cerned de facto each year only a very small fraction of the popula-
tion. Moreover, the concerned individuals are less likely to work
overtime; these people generally have wages well above the median
wage or at the top end of the income/wealth distribution, while the
detaxation of overtime hours concerns a large population paid below
or around the median wage.
• Third, this small fraction of beneficiaries is not necessarily more fre-
quently found among transborders, because both groups are simi-
lar in many characteristics that are key to benefiting from these mea-
sures:
ðaÞ The difference in age across groups, which is very small ð39 for
transborders, 37 for the treatedÞ, could not explain significant
differences in the death probability of a parent.
ðbÞ The socioeconomic backgrounds of both groups, which are very
close ðsee tables F2 and F3 in app. FÞ, could not induce significant
differences in family tranfers.
ðcÞ The probability to move and buy a house is low and not differ-
ent either ðactually only 1.03% of transborders in our sample did
change residence within 12 months after October 2007, against
0.92% for the treated groupÞ.
Overall, these additional measures concern a very small portion of the
population likely to work overtime and are unlikely to have benefited
transborders more than workers in France. In particular, we checked that
this is the case for the tax credit on mortgage interest introduced by the
TEPA law, which is the additional measure with the strongest potential
incidence: the probability of being a home owner for employees working
in France did not change at all between before October 2007 and after
October 2007 compared to that of transborder employees.
1. Identifying the Impact of Detaxation on Hours Worked
and Overtime Hours
The evaluation of the impact of the detaxation of overtime hours is
realized through estimating the benchmark equation
Yict 5 b0 1 b1ðDt  FiÞ1 b2Dt 1 b3Xct 1 ni 1 εit; ð1Þ
where Yict designates the duration of work or the paid overtime hours of
individual i employed in country c on date t;Dt is a dummy variable equal
to zero before October 1, 2007, and to one subsequently; Fi is a dummy
variable equal to one for wage earners employed in France and to zero for
transborder workers; Xct is a variable representing the quarterly economic
situation, measured, according to the specifications, by the business cli-
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mate or by the share of exports of goods and services in the GDP of
country c at date t ðquarterly indicators of the OECDÞ; νi is a fixed in-
dividual effect; and εit is a random factor of null average.
To make sure that the estimated effect of the treatment reflects an ac-
tual break from trend rather than a preexisting trend, a time trend in-
teracted with the dummy for the treatment group is added to the bench-
mark equation ð1Þ. The coefficient b1 measures the difference in variation
after and before October 2007 between the hours of work ðor the over-
time hoursÞ of wage earners employed in France and transborder work-
ers. In the context presented above, the coefficient b1 measures the im-
pact of the detaxation of overtime hours on the duration of work or on
overtime hours. We also study the effect of detaxation on the probability
to work overtime hours by considering the case where Yict equals one if
the individual concerned is paid overtime hours and equals zero other-
wise.
2. Identifying the Impact of Detaxation on Tax Optimization
In line with our theoretical part, it is also worth analyzing the behavior
of wage earners whose duration of work is a priori difficult to verify. In
this perspective, it is enlightening to look at the “gap” variable, equal to
the difference between work duration and the number of overtime hours
declared to the authorities. A decrease in the gap variable corresponds to
an augmentation of overtime hours greater than the augmentation of hours
really worked. As predicted by the theoretical model, in the presence of
tax optimization, which induces individuals to report fake overtime hours,
the gap variable should drop when overtime hours are detaxed. This drop
should be larger when work duration is more difficult to verify by the au-
thorities. There should be no drop when work duration is perfectly veri-
fiable. Therefore, the difference between the gap of employees whose hours
of work are difficult to verify and that of other employees whose hours of
work are easily verifiable should decrease for workers who work in France
compared to transborder workers. This triple-differences strategy allows
us to evaluate the potential impact of the detaxation of overtime hours by
comparing the behavior of individuals among the group of French work-
ers, taking transborder workers as a control group.
To choose the group of workers whose hours of work are difficult to
verify, we rely on the observation that it is harder to check on the hours
worked by employees who enjoy greater autonomy in the scheduling of
their work. In France, authorities verify hours on the basis of documents
provided by firms. The reliability of these documents can be checked at
the workplace by labor inspectors. Laborers generally work at a given
place,26 where they have a closely regulated duration of work, frequently
26 “Laborers” comprises skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers in the man-
ufacturing, transportation, storage, and craft industries.
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recorded by time clocks or registered on books filled in on a daily basis at
the workplace. The hours of about 67% of these employees are system-
atically controlled and registered by their supervisors.27 This gives the
authorities some basis to check the reliability of the overtime hours re-
ported to the administration. By contrast, the hours of work of only about
30% of managers, technicians, professionals, supervisors, and those em-
ployed in the intellectual and artistic professions, who can work in vari-
ous places, sometimes even at home, are controlled by their supervisors.
Hence, their hours are much more difficult to verify by the authorities.
Indeed, simple descriptive statistics on individuals working in France
show that managers, technicians, professionals, supervisors, and those em-
ployed in the intellectual and artistic professions did behave differently
from laborers before and after October 2007. In order to focus on indi-
viduals whose potential optimization behavior is observable, we select
those who reported overtime hours after October 1, 2007. Table 1 reports
the overtime hours, the hours worked, and the gap variable for employees
working in France, present both before and after the reform in our sample,
and declaring paid overtime hours after October 1, 2007. The two first
columns display the value of these variables before and after October 1,
2007. The third column shows that the difference between hours declared
to the authorities and hours worked by employees whose hours of work
are hard to verify who have declared overtime hours since October 1, 2007,
has increased considerably from that date on. More than three-quarters
of the increase in their overtime hours declared is not matched by any
increase in their length of time worked. Table 1 shows, on the other hand,
that there is no decrease in the gap between the duration worked and the
overtime hours declared to the authorities for laborers who have declared
overtime hours starting in October 2007.
To shed more light on the differences in behavior of workers whose
duration of work is hard to verify and those whose work duration is easier
to verify, we estimate the following equation:
Yict 5 b0 1 b1ðDt  FiÞ1 b2Dt 1 b3Xct 1 b4ðDt OiÞ
1 b5ðDt  Fi OiÞ1 ni 1 εit;
ð2Þ
where notations are the same as in equation ð1Þ and where Oi is a dummy
variable equal to one for managers, technicians, professionals, supervisors,
and those employed in the intellectual and artistic professions and to zero
for laborers. Other types of workers are excluded from the sample when
27 Enqueˆtes sur les conditions de travail, 2005, http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG
/xls/A1R5_Le_controle_des_horaires.xls.
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this equation is estimated. The behavior of workers whose hours are diffi-
cult to verify, relative to those whose hours can be verified more easily, is
captured by the triple-differences coefficient b5.
3. Results
We begin by presenting the impact of detaxation on hours worked and
overtime hours. Then we provide evidence on tax optimization.
The first row of table 2 shows the difference between the overtime
hours of wage earners working in France and transborder workers be-
fore and after October 1, 2007 ðcoefficient b1 of eq. ½1Þ. The second row
shows the difference between the hours worked of wage earners working
in France and transborder workers. The first column presents the results
for the benchmark equation, without controlling for the economic situa-
tion and without time trends. The second and third columns take into
account differences in economic situation represented by two alternative
measures: the economic climate reported by the OECD quarterly surveys
ðcol. 2Þ and the share of exports in the gross domestic product of each
Table 1
Overtime Hours and Hours Worked for Employees Working in France
and Declaring Paid Overtime Hours after October 1, 2007
Before
October 1,
2007
ð1Þ
After
October 1,
2007
ð2Þ
After2Before
ð3Þ
p-Value
ð4Þ
N
ð5Þ
Managers, technicians,
supervisors, professionals,
and the intellectual or
artistic professions:
Overtime hours ðaÞ 1.258
ð.171Þ
2.860
ð.232Þ
1.602
ð.288Þ .0000 631
Hours worked ðbÞ 41.04
ð.430Þ
41.30
ð.292Þ
.261
ð.519Þ .6157 631
Gap 5 ðb2aÞ 39.78
ð.424Þ
38.44
ð.258Þ
21.341
ð.497Þ .0072 631
Laborers:
Overtime hours ðaÞ 1.543
ð.098Þ
2.896
ð.114Þ
1.354
ð.151Þ .0000 2,047
Hours worked ðbÞ 38.81
ð.140Þ
40.03
ð.137Þ
1.221
ð.196Þ .0000 2,047
Gap 5 ðb2aÞ 37.26
ð.112Þ
37.13
ð.094Þ
2.133
ð.146Þ .3629 2,047
NOTE.—Weekly number of overtime hours and of hours worked by full-time employees of the non-
agricultural for-profit sector. Average value for individuals interrogated before and after October 2007
who have declared overtime hours after October 2007. Null hypothesis: after-before difference is equal
to zero. The variable gap is the difference between hours of work and overtime hours declared to the
authorities. “Laborers” comprises skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers in the manufacturing, trans-
portation, storage, and craft industries. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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bordering country ðcol. 3Þ. In columns 4–6, a time trend interactedwith the
dummy for the treatment group is added to the previous specifications.28
As a whole, table 2 shows that there is no significant difference in the
evolution of the durations of work of employees working in France and
transborder employees ðthird row of table 2Þ. Conversely, the number of
overtime hours declared by the employees working in France increases,
relative to that of transborder employees, at the 10% level of confidence.
However, as shown by the fourth row of table 2, the reform did not in-
crease the probability to report overtime hours, and the third row shows
that the difference between changes in overtime hours and hours worked
is not statistically significant. Table 2 shows that the results are very sta-
ble across specifications.
Our theoretical framework suggests that the reformmay have a different
impact on workers whose duration of work is hard to verify and on those
whose work duration is verified more easily. From this perspective, it is
worth analyzing in greater depth the behavior of wage earners whose du-
ration of work is a priori difficult to verify. Table 3, which reports the
results of the estimation coefficient b1 of equation ð1Þ, for employees whose
duration of work is hard to verify, indicates that the detaxation of overtime
28 These results, as well as the following, remain qualitatively the same when we
exclude individuals who have only been queried once before or after the reform.
Hence, they are unlikely to stem from potential measurement errors.
Table 2
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours for All Full-Time Employees:
Estimates of the Difference-in-Differences Coefﬁcient of Equation ð1Þ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Overtime hours ðaÞ .436* .433* .382* .444* .443* .423*
ð.242Þ ð.242Þ ð.243Þ ð.246Þ ð.246Þ ð.246Þ
Hours worked ðbÞ .183 .182 .151 .238 .238 .223
ð.311Þ ð.311Þ ð.312Þ ð.315Þ ð.315Þ ð.316Þ
Gap 5 ðb2aÞ 2.252 2.251 2.231 2.206 2.205 2.200
ð.277Þ ð.277Þ ð.278Þ ð.281Þ ð.281Þ ð.281Þ
Probability of overtime .037 .037 .029 .039 .038 .035
ð.030Þ ð.030Þ ð.030Þ ð.031Þ ð.031Þ ð.031Þ
Economic situation No Climate Export No Climate Export
Time trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
NOTE.—Shown are regressions with individual fixed effects. Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector.
Control group is transborder employees. Observations 5 5,254, of which 4,509 are for the treatment
group and 745 are for the control group. The first column presents the results for the benchmark equa-
tion, without controlling for the economic situation and without time trends. The second and third col-
umns take into account differences in economic situation represented by two alternative measures: the
economic climate reported by the OECD quarterly surveys ðcol. 2Þ and the share of exports in the gross
domestic product of each bordering country ðcol. 3Þ. In cols. 4–6, a time trend interacted with the dummy
for the treatment group is added to the previous specifications. Gap: difference between hours worked
and overtime hours. Probability of overtime: equals one if the individual reports overtime hours and
equals zero if the individual does not report overtime hours. Economic situation: share of exports in GDP
or business climate from quarterly OECD database. Robust standard deviations are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
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hours led to more overtime hours for these employees without having any
impact on their hours worked.
The number of overtime hours increases more for these employees,
around 0.7 hours as opposed to 0.4 for all types of employees ðsee table 2Þ.
The probability to report overtime hours also increases significantly for
employees working in France relative to transborder workers. It is strik-
ing to note that for those wage earners whose duration of work is a priori
difficult to verify, paid overtime hours of those working in France grew
compared to those of the transborder employees, whereas their hours
worked did not increase in absolute terms relative to those of the trans-
border employees. Accordingly, as shown by the third row of table 3, the
difference between changes in hours worked and reported overtime hours
declined for those working in France relative to the transborder employ-
ees. This effect, which is significant at the 5% level of confidence, is
sizable, since it amounts to about 1.3 hours per week. Indeed, this is a very
large effect compared to the average number of reported overtime hours
before the reform, which amounts to 0.2 per week for this category of
workers. Table 3 shows that these results are very stable across specifi-
cations, including different measures of the economic situation and time
Table 3
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours for Full-Time Employees
Whose Hours Are Less Veriﬁable: Estimates of the Difference-in-Differences
Coefﬁcient of Equation ð1Þ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Overtime hours ðaÞ .743* .747* .665 .784* .784* .748*
ð.446Þ ð.446Þ ð.449Þ ð.466Þ ð.466Þ ð.466Þ
Hours worked ðbÞ 2.607 2.608 2.632 2.519 2.526 2.518
ð.561Þ ð.561Þ ð.566Þ ð.578Þ ð.576Þ ð.581Þ
Gap 5 ðb2aÞ 21.350** 21.355** 21.297** 21.303** 21.310** 21.266**
ð.605Þ ð.604Þ ð.610Þ ð.629Þ ð.628Þ ð.631Þ
Probability of overtime .071** .072** .055 .076** .076** .068*
ð.036Þ ð.036Þ ð.037Þ ð.037Þ ð.037Þ ð.038Þ
Economic situation No Climate Export No Climate Export
Time trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
NOTE.—Shown are regressions with individual fixed effects. Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector.
Employees whose hours are hard to verify comprise teaching and the scientific professions, media pro-
fessions, arts and entertainment, administrative and commercial managers of firms, engineers, profes-
sionals, foremen and supervisors. Observations 5 1,143, of which 954 are of the treatment group and 189
are of the control group. The control group is transborder employees in similar positions. The first
column presents the results for the benchmark equation, without controlling for the economic situation
and without time trends. The second and third columns take into account differences in economic
situation represented by two alternative measures: the economic climate reported by the OECD quarterly
surveys (col. 2) and the share of exports in the gross domestic product of each bordering country (col. 3).
In cols. 4–6, a time trend interacted with the dummy for the treatment group is added to the previous
specifications. Gap: difference between hours worked and overtime hours. Probability of overtime equals
one if the individual reports overtime hours and equals zero if the individual does not report overtime
hours. Economic situation 5 share of exports in GDP or business climate from quarterly OECD data-
base. Robust standard deviations are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
trends. Overall, table 3 indicates that the detaxation of overtime hours led
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to more overtime hours for categories of employees whose duration of
work is hard to verify without having any impact on their hours worked.
Table 4, which reports the triple-differences coefficient of equation ð2Þ,
indicates that the optimizing behavior of workers whose duration of work
is hard to verify is indeed very different from that of laborers. Although
nonsignificant, the triple-differences coefficient associated with overtime
hours is positive and that associated with hours of work is negative, indi-
cating that workers whose hours of work are difficult to verify reported
more overtime hours and worked fewer hours than laborers after the re-
form in France compared with bordering regions. It is likely that the triple-
difference coefficients on hours and on overtime hours are not signifi-
cant because the number of observations is more limited than in table 2,
where we did not focus on any particular subgroup. However, the triple-
differences coefficient for the gap variable, which is significant at the
5% level, indicates that the difference in the gap variable of workers whose
working hours are hard to verify and that of laborers working in France
decreased by 1.3 hours per week compared with transborder workers.
Hence, the reform has had a very different impact on workers whose hours
are hard to verify and on those whose hours are easier to verify. The for-
mer increased their overtime hours without increasing their actual work-
ing time, whereas, for the latter, overtime hours and hours of work changed
by the same amount, as shown by estimations not reported here. This sug-
Table 4
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours for Employees Whose Hours
Are Less Veriﬁable Compared to Laborers ðSkilled and Unskilled Blue-Collar
Workers in Manufacturing, Transportation, Storage, and Craft IndustriesÞ:
Estimates of the Triple-Differences Coefﬁcient of Equation ð2Þ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Overtime hours ðaÞ .680 .702 .625 .692 .707 .673
ð.548Þ ð.548Þ ð.550Þ ð.551Þ ð.551Þ ð.550Þ
Hours worked ðbÞ 2.641 2.626 2.684 2.612 2.606 2.626
ð.691Þ ð.692Þ ð.693Þ ð.691Þ ð.691Þ ð.691Þ
Gap 5 ðb2aÞ 21.321** 21.327** 21.309** 21.304** 21.313** 21.298**
ð.654Þ ð.653Þ ð.654Þ ð.660Þ ð.659Þ ð.659Þ
Economic situation No Climate Export No Climate Export
Time trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
NOTE.—Shown are regressions with individual fixed effects. Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector.
Employeeswhosehoursarehard toverifycomprise teachingandthescientificprofessions,mediaprofessions,
arts and entertainment, administrative and commercial managers of firms, engineers, professionals, fore-
men and supervisors. Observations5 3,496, of which 2,904 are for the treatment group and 592 are for the
control group. Control group is transborder employees in similar positions. The first column presents the
results for the benchmark equation, without controlling for the economic situation andwithout time trends.
The second and third columns take into account differences in economic situation represented by two alter-
native measures: the economic climate reported by the OECD quarterly surveys (col. 2) and the share of
exports in the gross domestic product of each bordering country (col. 3). In cols. 4–6, a time trend interacted
with the dummy for the treatment group is added to the previous specifications. Gap: difference between
hours worked and overtime hours reported to the administration. Economic situation: share of exports
in GDP or business climate from quarterly OECD database. Robust standard deviations are in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5% level.
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gests that the reform has had a positive impact on the overtime hours de-
clared by highly qualified wage earners because of the leeway they have
to manipulate the overtime hours they declare in order to minimize their
taxes.
4. Robustness Checks
Our results might be driven by workers who change jobs. In particular,
it is possible that individuals whose hours are difficult to verify moved
from jobs or sectors where overtime hours are few to jobs where overtime
hours are more commonly used. To check whether this is the case, we re-
strict the sample to the individuals who stay in the same job over the whole
period. Table 5 shows that restricting the analysis to workers who stay in
the same job does not change our results for the benchmark equation ð1Þ.
For these workers, the reform also increases overtime hours but not hours
worked.
Another concern is that the discrepancy in the results on hours worked
and on overtime hours might stem from differences in the standard devi-
ations in the two variables. The effect of the tax reform on overtime hours
and hours worked could be equal, but the large standard deviation in hours
worked with respect to that of overtime hours could imply that the esti-
mated effect on overtime hours is more significant than the estimated effect
on hours worked. This is a plausible issue since the standard deviation of
hours worked is larger than that of overtime hours, as shown in table F1 in
appendix F. In order to deal with this issue, we estimate the impact of the
reform on the log of hours worked and on the log of overtime hours ðmore
precisely, logð11 overtime hoursÞÞ.29 Estimates not reported here ðbut
available from the authorsÞ show that the results are similar to those ob-
tained with the previous estimations carried out on the number of hours
instead of on the log of hours.
The results might be driven by differences in the composition of the
control group and the treatment group. It is shown in appendix F that
these groups are similar along several important dimensions. However, it
turns out that there are more workers in firms with no more than 20 em-
ployees in the treatment group than in the control group ð24% and 12%,
respectivelyÞ. In order to deal with this issue, we reweighted the sample
to match the share of employees in firms with no more than 20 employees
29 The logarithmic transformation is suitable when the data cover a wide range of
values, as is the case for hours worked. This transformation squeezes the bigger val-
ues and stretches smaller values. The standard deviation of the log of hours worked
is equal to 0.114 ðinstead of 4.907 in levelÞ. The standard deviation of logð11
overtime hoursÞ is equal to 0.546 ðinstead of 2.112 in levelÞ. Thus, the difference
between standard deviations is smaller in log than in level. Moreover, the standard
deviation of logð11 overtime hoursÞ is larger than that of the log of hours, whereas
the standard deviation of hours is larger than that of overtime hours.
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in the treatment group with that of the control group. We find that the
estimates obtained with this sample are similar to those obtained with
the original sample.30
Another concern is the generalizability of the results to French workers
who do not belong to our treatment group, that is, those who live away
from the border. Table F1 in appendix F shows that the characteristics of
our treatment group are not different from those of the rest of French
workers who live away from the frontier. Moreover, in order to check the
generalizability of our central result according to which the gap variable
ðequal to the difference between hours of work and overtime hours re-
ported to the authoritiesÞ of individuals whose hours of work are hard
to verify decreased between before and after October 1, 2007, we analyzed
30 It is possible that the results obtained for the sample of all full-time workers in
the nonagricultural for-profit sector might hide some heterogeneity in the behavior
of some groups of workers who have been affected differently by the reform. In
particular, as noted above, the reform provided some more slight advantages to
workers employed in firms with no more than 20 employees. Unfortunately, we
do not have enough observations to check whether the reform had a different im-
pact across workers employed in firms with no more than 20 employees and other
workers.
Table 5
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours for Full-Time Employees
Whose Hours Are Less Veriﬁable and Who Do Not Change Job over the
Whole Period: Estimates of the Difference-in-Differences Coefﬁcient of
Equation ð1Þ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Overtime hours ðaÞ .747* .750* .671* .790* .789* .754*
ð.447Þ ð.447Þ ð.450Þ ð.467Þ ð.467Þ ð.467Þ
Hours worked ðbÞ 2.533 2.534 2.554 2.443 2.449 2.437
ð.559Þ ð.559Þ ð.564Þ ð.576Þ ð.574Þ ð.579Þ
Gap 5 ðb2aÞ 21.279** 21.285** 21.224** 21.233** 21.239** 21.192*
ð.604Þ ð.603Þ ð.608Þ ð.628Þ ð.626Þ ð.629Þ
Probability of overtime .071** .072** .055 .076** .076** .068*
ð.036Þ ð.036Þ ð.037Þ ð.037Þ ð.037Þ ð.038Þ
Economic situation No Climate Export No Climate Export
Time trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
NOTE.—Shown are regressions with individual fixed effects. Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector.
Employees whose hours are hard to verify comprise teaching and the scientific professions, media pro-
fessions, arts and entertainment, administrative and commercial managers of firms, engineers, profes-
sionals, foremen and supervisors. Observations5 1,112, of which 924 are for the treatment group and 188
are for the control group. Control group is transborder employees in similar positions. The first column
presents the results for the benchmark equation, without controlling for the economic situation and
without time trends. The second and third columns take into account differences in economic situation
represented by two alternative measures: the economic climate reported by the OECD quarterly sur-
veys (col. 2) and the share of exports in the gross domestic product of each bordering country (col. 3). In
cols. 4–6, a time trend interacted with the dummy for the treatment group is added to the previous spec-
ifications. Gap: difference between hours worked and overtime hours. Probability of overtime: equals one
if the individual reports overtime hours and equals zero if the individual does not report overtime hours.
Economic situation: share of exports in GDP or business climate from quarterly OECD database. Robust
standard deviations are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
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whether this variable evolved differently for individuals belonging to our
treatment group and for other individuals working in France ðbut not
near the borderÞ between before and after October 1, 2007. Thus, we ran
a difference-in-differences estimation with two groups: our treatment
group on the one hand and other individuals working in France on the
other hand. The results ðnot reported hereÞ show that individuals be-
longing to our treatment group and other individuals working in France
did not behave differently.
Finally, it is not certain that changes in overtime hours in treatment and
control groups around the time of the reform are truly unusual. To deal
with this issue, we implement a placebo test by running the same regres-
sions as in table 3 but in October 2006 and October 2008 instead of Oc-
tober 2007. The results, available from the authors, show that the changes
in hours worked and overtime hours observed in October 2007 do not
show up in October 2006 or October 2008. In particular, reported over-
time hours and hours worked of individuals working in France and
transborder employees did not evolve differently, contrary to what is ob-
served in October 2007.
In sum, the comparison of the evolution of the length of time worked of
wage earners employed in France and that of transborder workers in-
dicates that the detaxation of overtime hours has had no significant effect
on length of time worked. This result holds good for all categories of em-
ployees, whatever their socioprofessional classification or their wage level.
Conversely, detaxation of overtime hours has increased the number of over-
time hours declared by relatively highly qualified employees, whose dura-
tion of work is particularly hard to verify.
B. Employees of Very Small Firms and Independent Workers
1. An Alternative Strategy of Identification
In order to ensure the robustness of the foregoing results concerning
the impact of detaxation on length of time worked, we apply the same
difference-in-differences method as before, but we now select different
treatment and control groups. As opposed to the previous strategy, we now
consider only individuals working in France. The treatment group com-
prises wage earners in very small firms, with a single employee, and the
control group comprises independent workers who do not employ wage
earners. If the detaxation of overtime hours has really had an impact on the
duration of work of employees, we ought to observe a rupture, starting in
October 2007, in the difference of duration of work of wage earners in very
small firms, who are concerned by the reform, and independents workers
without employees, who are not directly concerned. Obviously, this
strategy allows us to analyze the impact of the reform on hours of work but
not on overtime hours to the extent that independent workers do not report
overtime hours.
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Applying the same selection criteria as for our main sample ðeliminating
individuals with a work duration over 70 hours per week, retaining ones
whose work schedules have not been interrupted, etc.Þ, we have 2,066
observations for individuals queried before and after October 2007, in-
cluding 1,311 observations for independent workers and 755 for employ-
ees in very small firms.
Comparison of the evolution of the duration of work between these
two groups does not necessarily make it possible to identify a causal impact
of detaxation on the duration of work. Several different factors might
affect the hours worked of these two groups, independently of the de-
taxation of overtime hours:
ð1Þ For one thing, the independents might have individual character-
istics and specific working conditions that cause them to react differently
to the economic situation than employees do. In order to limit these dif-
ferences, we compare independents not employing a wage earner with
wage earners in firms having just one employee.31 Moreover, we also study
separately two families of trades within which economic conditions are
more homogeneous: first, independent craftsmen and wage-earning labor-
ers in the craft sector and, second, independent retailers and retail employ-
ees.32 We thus verify that the length of time worked has not varied differ-
ently between employees and independents within these two families since
2003. Finally, we continue to take account of the heterogeneity of observ-
able and nonobservable characteristics, which do not change over time, be-
tween independents and employees by including fixed individual effects.
Summary statistics of observable characteristics among employees and in-
dependent workers are presented in appendix G.
ð2Þ As in the case of the transborder workers, the composition of the
two groups might evolve over time. A reform occurring in 2008, which
created the easily accessible and fiscally advantageous status of auto-
entrepreneur ðself-entrepreneurÞ, might have facilitated the transition from
the status of wage earner to that of independent. To take account of these
changes, we confine ourselves to individuals who change neither their sta-
tus nor their job during the period, while following the same ensemble
of workers before and after the reform.
ð3Þ Other reforms might have influenced the durations of work of the
two groups independently. We have identified none of sufficient impor-
tance for the period preceding and following the reform of 2007, the fis-
31 Some characteristics of these independents and employees are presented in
tables G1–G3.
32 We compare the change in the duration of work in occupations for which the
data are sufficiently abundant. Other occupations, like the liberal professions or
the health professions, cannot be studied because of the lack of a sufficient number
of observations in our sample, either among employees or among independents.
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cal regime having been globally stable over the whole of the period.
ð4Þ Finally, by reducing the labor cost of wage earners, the detaxation of
overtime hours might give them an advantage over independents. In con-
sequence, the detaxation of overtime hours might reduce the duration of
work of the independents, who might lose market share to wage earners.
This effect can only be slight inasmuch as the detaxation of overtime hours
has only a slight effect on the cost of labor. Still, this does create a risk of
overestimating the impact of detaxation on the length of time worked.
The impact of the reform is evaluated by estimating an equation similar
to equation ð1Þ for hours worked.
2. Results
Table 6 shows that the difference between the duration of work of
independent workers without employees, on the one hand, and the du-
ration of work of employees who work in firms with a single employee,
on the other hand, remains stable over the whole period. Indeed, there is
no increase in the relative duration of work of the employees beginning
in the fourth quarter of 2007, as shown by the estimated value of coeffi-
cient b1 of equation ð1Þ and its standard deviation. The first column con-
cerns the ensemble of employees in very small firms and independents
not employing a wage earner. For these two groups, there is no signifi-
cant difference in the evolution of the duration of work before and after
the reform of 2007. The second column displays the results when a time
trend interacted with the dummy for the treatment group is added to the
previous specification. Columns 3 and 4 show the results when the depen-
dent variable is the log of hours. Results are stable across specifications.
These results are confirmed by comparison with two distinct groups, those
Table 6
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours on Hours Worked of Wage
Earners in Firms with One Employee: Estimates of the Difference-in-
Differences Coefﬁcient of Equation ð1Þ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ ð7Þ ð8Þ
Hours worked 2.268 2.260 2.006 2.006 2.026 2.035 2.818 2.862
ð.351Þ ð.351Þ ð.008Þ ð.008Þ ð.487Þ ð.488Þ ð.851Þ ð.844Þ
Time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,066 2,066 2,066 2,066 912 912 559 559
Employees 755 755 755 755 285 285 63 63
Independent 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311 627 627 496 496
NOTE.—Shown are regressions with individual fixed effects. Samples are from the nonagricultural for-
profit sector. Control group is independent workers without employees. Columns 1 and 2: all employees
and independent workers; dependent variable is hours worked. Columns 3 and 4: all employees and
independent workers; dependent variable is log of hours worked. Columns 5 and 6: employees and
independent workers in the craft sector; dependent variable is hours worked. Columns 7 and 8: employees
and independent workers in the retail sector; dependent variable is hours worked. Robust standard
deviations are in parentheses.
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who work in the craft sector and those who work in the retail sector.
Columns 5 and 6 concern the craft sector. Columns 7 and 8 concern the
retail sector. In these two sectors, there is no significant difference in the
evolution of the duration of work as between employees and independents.
Finally, these results confirm the absence of an effect of the reform of
October 2007 on the duration of work obtained previously by comparing
employees working in France and those working abroad. The detaxation
of overtime hours has had no detectable impact on the length of time
worked.
VI. Conclusion
The detaxation of overtime hours introduced in October 2007 was
intended to allow individuals in France toworkmore so as to earnmore. The
evaluation conducted in this article indicates that the detaxation of over-
time hours has not, in fact, had any significant impact on hours worked.
Conversely, it has indeed had a positive impact on paid overtime hours,
which create an entitlement to tax reductions. Thus, the detaxation of
overtime hours appears not to have fully met its aim: while the wage earn-
ers concerned have indeed benefited from a spike in their remuneration
thanks to detaxation, that has not, on average, come about through work-
ing more. Detaxation is a costly measure for the public purse, without any
ascertained impact on hours worked.
This evaluation has focused on the impact of themeasure on hours.Other
dimensions could be explored, for example, employment or employee mo-
tivation. The fact that hours worked do not increase after October 2007
suggests, however, that the measure must have had a very limited effect on
employment.
Appendix A
Impact of the Detaxation on Earnings and Labor Cost
Table A1
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours on Monthly Net Earnings
and Labor Costs ðin EurosÞ for 4 Overtime Hours per Week at the
Minimum Wage ð€1,056 Net as of January 2010Þ, for Single Person, with
No Children, Working in a Firm with 20 or Fewer Employees
At the Minimum Wage: Before After After2Before
Additional cost for employer ðIÞ 1192 1193 0
Additional earnings for employee ðIIÞ 193 1145 152
Wedge ðI 2 IIÞ 100 48 252
NOTE.—Calculations include mandatory extra pay on overtime ðincreased for small firms from Oc-
tober 2007Þ, employees’ and employers’ social security contributions ðdecreased from October 2007Þ,
income tax exemption for employees ðapplicable from October 2007Þ, and the impact of additional earn-
ings on in-work tax credit for employees where applicable.
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Table A2
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours on Monthly Net Earnings
and Labor Costs ðin EurosÞ for 4 Overtime Hours per Week at the
Minimum Wage ð€1,056 Net as of January 2010Þ, for Single Person, with
No Children, Working in a Firm with More than 20 Employees
At the Minimum Wage: Before After After2Before
Additional cost for employer ðIÞ 1223 1214 29
Additional earnings for employee ðIIÞ 1111 1145 134
Wedge ðI2 IIÞ 112 69 243
NOTE.—Calculations include mandatory extra pay on overtime ðincreased for small firms from Oc-
tober 2007Þ, employees’ and employers’ social security contributions ðdecreased from October 2007Þ,
income tax exemption for employees ðapplicable from October 2007Þ, and the impact of additional
earnings on in-work tax credit for employees where applicable.
Table A3
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours on Monthly Net Earnings
and Labor Costs ðin EurosÞ for 4 Overtime Hours per Week at 1.6 Times
the Minimum Wage ð€1,689 Net as of January 2010Þ, for Single Person,
with No Children, Working in a Firm with 20 or Fewer Employees
At 1.6  the Minimum Wage: Before After After2Before
Additional cost for employer ðIÞ 1384 1410 126
Additional earnings for employee ðIIÞ 1213 1334 1121
Wedge ðI2IIÞ 171 76 295
NOTE.—Calculations include mandatory extra pay on overtime ðincreased for small firms from Oc-
tober 2007Þ, employees’ and employers’ social security contributions ðdecreased from October 2007Þ,
income tax exemption for employees ðapplicable from October 2007Þ, and the impact of additional
earnings on in-work tax credit for employees where applicable.
Table A4
Impact of the Detaxation of Overtime Hours on Monthly Net Earnings
and Labor Costs ðin EurosÞ for 4 Overtime Hours per Week at 1.6 times the
Minimum Wage, for Single Person, with No Children, Working in a Firm
with More than 20 Employees
At 1.6  the Minimum Wage: Before After After2Before
Additional cost for employer ðIÞ 1436 1427 29
Additional earnings for employee ðIIÞ 1242 1341 199
Wedge ðI2 IIÞ 195 87 2108
NOTE.—Calculations include mandatory extra pay on overtime ðincreased for small firms from Oc-
tober 2007Þ, employees’ and employers’ social security contributions ðdecreased from October 2007Þ,
income tax exemption for employees ðapplicable from October 2007Þ, and the impact of additional earn-
ings on in-work tax credit for employees where applicable.
Appendix B
Questions Relating to the Duration of Work in the Enquête Emploi
Persons interrogated in the Enqueˆte Emploi who have worked during
the reference week must describe their professional activity. After ques-
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tions about holidays that may have been taken during this period, the
following questions relating to the duration of work are asked:
Question B46a (variable EMPHSC): “Have you worked overtime ðor
complementaryÞ hours, paid or not?”
Question B46b (variable EMPHNH): “How many overtime ðor
complementaryÞ hours?”
Question B46c (variable EMPHRE): “Of these overtime ðor com-
plementaryÞ hours, how many are or will be remunerated?”
Question B46d [if the overtime hours were not all remunerated] (var-
iable EMPHRC): “And how many have created or will create an en-
titlement to compensatory rest?”
Question B47a (variable EMPAFF): “Was your schedule affected by
the following causes?” ½several possible answers
1. Partial unemployment, bad weather?
2. Time spent on training?
3. Strike, labor conflict?
4. No, by none of the above factors.
Question B47b (variable EMPAFC): “How many hours or days of
partial unemployment or bad weather?”
Question B47c (variable EMPAFA): “How many hours or days of
training?”
Question B47d (variable EMPAFG): “How many hours or days of
strike or labor conflict?”
Question B48a (variable EMPNBH): “During the week Monday to
Sunday ðdatesÞ, how many hours did you put in at your principal job ðnot
counting ordinary hours or days off, or exceptional ones, or legal holidays,
bridges, make-up time, personal unpaid time off, partial unemployment,
training, strike, labor conflictÞ?”
Appendix C
Presentation of the Additional Tax Measures Introduced by the
TEPA Law
1. Income Tax Credit on Mortgage Interest
The law created a tax credit equivalent to 40% of interest payments the
first year, then 20% for the 4 following years, with an annual limit of
€3,750 for single persons and €7,500 for couples plus €500 per dependent
during the first 5 years. This measure concerns only the purchase of the
main residence from August 22, 2007, with no retroactivity ðit was
abolished January 1, 2011Þ. Actual beneficiaries in 2008: 1.3% of house-
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holds in 2008 and 3.5% cumulated in 2009.33 Only 25% of people buying
their main residence have income below the median wage.34
2. Relief from Inheritance Tax
TEPA extended the inheritance tax relief to the surviving spouse, in-
creased the level of tax-free donation per child or disabled persons from
€50,000 to €150,000, and introduced smaller discounts for siblings. The
number of exempted estates would increase approximately from 85% to
95%with the reduction of inheritance tax introduced by TEPA. This mea-
sure would benefit approximately 100,000 households each year among
the wealthiest only ð0.4% of all householdsÞ. The number of donations
to children and grandchildren in 2007 represented 2% of households,35
50% of which were classed as independent workers, farmers, and CEOs.36
3. Lower Tax on Wealth ðISFÞ
The abatement on the main residence was increased from 20% to 30%
for the solidarity tax on wealth ðISFÞ. The law also included a 75% re-
duction of ISF with a limit of €50,000 for taxpayers who invest in small
companies or give to private research foundations. In 2008, 2.1% of tax
payer estates were above €770,000 in 2008 ðthis changed to €1.3 million in
2012Þ.
4. Lowering the Tax Shield
The law lowered the tax shield from 60% to 50% beginning in 2008: no
one can pay more than 50% of his or her annual income in taxes ðthis was
abolished in 2012, starting January 1, 2013Þ. About 0.05% of tax payers
benefited from this measure every year.
33 http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/farandole/2012/pap/pdf
/Jaune2012_logement.pdf.
34 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1291/ip1291.pdf.
35 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/enseig/memothes/Memoire2011Goupille
.PPD.pdf.
36 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1127/ip1127.pdf.
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Appendix D
Statistics on Hours Worked and Overtime Hours
By Gender
Table D1
Average Number of Hours over the Week by
Gender for Individuals Queried Both before and
after October 2007
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
Men 39.18
ð5.08Þ
.57
ð2.18Þ
.24
ð1.37Þ
Women 37.88
ð3.88Þ
.22
ð1.24Þ
.20
ð1.16Þ
Total 38.76
ð4.76Þ
.46
ð1.93Þ
.23
ð1.31Þ
Observations 31,054 31,054 28,774
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working
full-time. Column 1, total hours worked by the employees; col. 2, paid
overtime hours by employees; col. 3, overtime hours creating entitle-
ment to compensatory rest by employees. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
By Age
Table D2
Average Number of Hours over the Week by Age
for Individuals Queried Both before and after
October 2007
Age ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
15–29 38.40
ð4.40Þ
.57
ð2.15Þ
.25
ð1.39Þ
30–39 39.00
ð4.91Þ
.49
ð1.95Þ
.25
ð1.35Þ
40–49 38.96
ð5.04Þ
.46
ð2.00Þ
.25
ð1.38Þ
50–59 38.57
ð4.50Þ
.26
ð1.42Þ
.15
ð1.02Þ
601 39.00
ð5.12Þ
.23
ð1.37Þ
.06
ð .46Þ
Observations 31,054 31,054 28,774
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working
full-time. Column 1, total hours worked by the employees; col. 2, paid
overtime hours by employees; col. 3, overtime hours creating entitle-
ment to compensatory rest by employees. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
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By Socioprofessional Category
Table D3
Average Number of Hours over the Week by Socioprofessional Category
for Individuals Queried Both before and after October 2007
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
Shopkeepers and craftsmen 42.92
ð7.67Þ
.63
ð2.70Þ
.18
ð1.13Þ
Managers and highly intellectual professions 44.51
ð6.29Þ
.16
ð1.22Þ
.23
ð1.50Þ
Intermediate professions 39.16
ð4.72Þ
.36
ð1.68Þ
.29
ð1.41Þ
White-collar employees 37.47
ð3.56Þ
.23
ð1.33Þ
.20
ð1.19Þ
Laborers 38.23
ð4.34Þ
.71
ð2.40Þ
.21
ð1.24Þ
Observations 31,054 31,054 28,774
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working full-time. Column 1, total hours
worked by the employees; col. 2, paid overtime hours by employees; col. 3, overtime hours creating
entitlement to compensatory rest by employees. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
By Level of Net Wage
Table D4
Average Number of Hours over the Week by Level of Net Wage for
Individuals Queried Both before and after October 2007
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
Less than 1.1 Smic 37.01
ð3.40Þ
.34
ð1.65Þ
.16
ð1.03Þ
1.1–1.3 Smic 37.74
ð3.66Þ
.45
ð1.77Þ
.21
ð1.22Þ
1.3–1.5 Smic 38.25
ð4.30Þ
.48
ð1.87Þ
.25
ð1.40Þ
1.5–1.7 Smic 39.56
ð4.92Þ
.56
ð2.15Þ
.22
ð1.28Þ
1.7–2 Smic 40.70
ð5.64Þ
.60
ð2.43Þ
.26
ð1.42Þ
2–2.3 Smic 41.72
ð5.64Þ
.48
ð2.11Þ
.32
ð1.52Þ
2.3–2.6 Smic 41.24
ð5.72Þ
.46
ð2.01Þ
.28
ð1.62Þ
2.6–3 Smic 41.47
ð5.44Þ
.38
ð1.91Þ
.29
ð1.52Þ
3–3.5 Smic 42.09
ð5.68Þ
.25
ð1.64Þ
.14
ð.90Þ
More than 3.5 Smic 45.16
ð7.53Þ
.24
ð1.63Þ
.36
ð1.83Þ
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Table D4 (Continued )
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
Total 38.76
ð4.76Þ
.46
ð1.93Þ
.23
ð1.30Þ
Observations 31,054 31,054 28,774
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working full-time. Smic 5 legal minimum
wage. Column 1, total hours worked by the employees; col. 2, paid overtime hours by employees; col. 3,
overtime hours creating entitlement to compensatory rest by employees. Standard deviations are in paren-
theses. Individuals are queried on their wage only twice over 6 quarters. This table is based on the assumption
that the wage remains constant between the two interrogations.
Appendix E
Evolution of Overtime Hours Creating Entitlement
to Compensatory Rest
Table E1 shows that the only significant change in the number ofovertime
hours creating entitlement to compensatory rest from October 2007 on is
observed for the ensemble of employees in the nonagricultural for-profit
sector.Nonetheless, there isno significant change for employeeswhodeclare
paid overtime hours. This means that the increase in paid overtime hours
observed beginning in October 2007 has not been matched by a diminution
in the number of overtime hours creating entitlement to compensatory
rest. We also observe an absence of significant change for overtime hours
creating entitlement to compensatory rest for laborers, engineers, managers,
teachers, scientists, and arts and entertainment professionals.
Table E1
Number of Overtime Hours Creating Entitlement to Compensatory Rest
Compensated Overtime
Hours
Before
October
2007
ð1Þ
After
October
2007
ð2Þ
After
October 20072
Before October
2007
ð3Þ
p-Value
ð4Þ
N
ð5Þ
All employees .232
ð.011Þ
.203
ð.010Þ
2.028
ð.015Þ
.059 28,774
Employees declaring
overtime hours after
October 1, 2007 .578
ð.061Þ
.498
ð.049Þ
2.081
ð.078Þ
.3040 2,724
Employees declaring more
overtime hours after
October 1, 2007 than
before that date .566
ð.064Þ
.473
ð.057Þ
2.093
ð.085Þ
.2779 2,316
Engineers, managers,
teachers, scientists, and
arts and entertainment
professionals .262
ð.024Þ
.223
ð.022Þ
2.033
ð.033Þ
.3059 7,515
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Table E1 (Continued )
Compensated Overtime
Hours
Before
October
2007
ð1Þ
After
October
2007
ð2Þ
After
October 20072
Before October
2007
ð3Þ
p-Value
ð4Þ
N
ð5Þ
Laborers .183
ð.015Þ
.161
ð.015Þ
2.022
ð.022Þ
.3177 10,581
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working full-time. Null hypothesis: Before
October 20072 after October 2007 difference is equal to zero. N 5 number of observations. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
Appendix F
Statistics on Transborder Employees
Table F1
Characteristics of Transborder Employees and Employees Working in
France near the Border, Individuals Queried Both before and after October
Transborder
Employees
Employees Working in
France Near the Border
Employees Working
Elsewhere in France
Male ð%Þ 78.8 68.0 67.1
Age 39.96
ð9.90Þ
38.19
ð10.76Þ
38.63
ð10.80Þ
Years in education 12.70
ð2.74Þ
13.07
ð2.97Þ
13.29
ð3.02Þ
Number of children .88
ð1.08Þ
.74
ð.98Þ
.76
ð.97Þ
Hours worked 42.57
ð4.65Þ
38.60
ð4.75Þ
38.69
ð4.72Þ
Overtime hours .55
ð2.18Þ
.54
ð2.08Þ
.44
ð1.90Þ
Small firms ð%Þ 14.3 24.6 25.2
Observations 745 4,509 25,800
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working full-time. Education: number of
years of education. Number of children: number of children below age 18 in the household. Weekly
number of overtime hours and hours worked. Small firms: percentage of individuals working in firms with
fewer than 20 employees. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table F2
Occupational Category of the Fathers of Transborder
Employees and Employees Working in France near the Border,
Individuals Queried Both before and after October 2007
Transborder
Employees ð%Þ
Employees Working
in France ð%Þ
Farmers 4.3 4.6
Craftsmen, traders, independent
workers, CEOs 7.5 11.1
Managers, engineers, media, and
intellectual professions 7.6 4.0
Technicians, supervisors, school
teachers 15.6 13.1
Table F2 (Continued )
Transborder
Employees ð%Þ
Employees Working
in France ð%Þ
Employees and laborers 62.7 62.1
Inactive ðother than retiredÞ .4 1.0
For those working:
Salaried workers 87.9 83.4
Independent and CEO 12.1 16.5
Observations 745 4,509
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working full-time. Oc-
cupation at the time the queried individuals finished their initial education. For those
working: the breakdown refers to fathers not inactive or unemployed.
Table F3
Occupational Category of the Mothers of Transborder
Employees and Employees Working in France near the
Border, Individuals Queried Both before and after October 2007
Transborder
Employees
ð%Þ
Employees Working
in France
ð%Þ
Farmers 1.2 2.6
Craftsmen, traders, independent
workers, CEOs 1.9 4.4
Managers, engineers, media, and
intellectual professions .1 .9
Technicians, supervisors, school
professors 5.4 6.3
Employees and laborers 36.6 37.0
Inactive 52.7 47.2
For those working:
Salaried workers 93.1 85.8
Independent and CEO 5.0 9.3
Observations 745 4,509
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working full-time. Oc-
cupation at the time the queried individuals finished their initial education. For those
working: the breakdown refers to mothers not inactive or unemployed.
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Appendix G
Statistics on Independent Workers
Table G1
Characteristics of Independents without Employees
and Employees in Firms with a Single Employee,
Individuals Queried Both before and after October
2007
Employees Independents
Male ð%Þ 68.7 75.1
Age 36.82
ð11.41Þ
43.67
ð9.80Þ
Years in education 13.51
ð3.43Þ
13.37
ð3.55Þ
Number of children .84
ð1.01Þ
.91
ð1.12Þ
Table G1 (Continued )
Employees Independents
Hours worked 39.83
ð6.63Þ
49.41
ð8.87Þ
Observations 755 1,311
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working
full-time. Education: number of years of education.Number of children:
number of children below age 18 in the household. Hours worked:
weekly number of hours worked. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table G2
Characteristics of Independents Without Employees
and Employees in Firms with a Single Employee
in the Craft Industry, Individuals Queried Both
before and after October 2007
Employees Independents
Male ð%Þ 97.9 83.1
Age 33.08
ð11.76Þ
43.36
ð8.87Þ
Education 11.91
ð2.37Þ
12.44
ð3.00Þ
Number of children .93
ð.97Þ
.98
ð1.13Þ
Hours worked 38.13
ð4.95Þ
48.59
ð8.05Þ
Observations 285 627
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working
full-time. Number of children: number of children below age 18 in the
household. Hours worked: weekly number of hours worked. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
Table G3
Characteristics of Independents without Employees
and Employees in Firms with a Single Employee in
the Retail Sector, Individuals Queried Both before
and after October 2007
Employees Independents
Male ð%Þ 33.3 65.9
Age 40.86
ð13.1Þ
44.66
ð10.56Þ
Education 13.83
ð2.76Þ
13.18
ð3.41Þ
Number of children .41
ð.80Þ
.86
ð1.04Þ
Hours worked 39.74
ð6.84Þ
50.87
ð9.66Þ
Observations 63 496
NOTE.—Sample is nonagricultural for-profit sector, person working
full-time. Education: number of years of education. Number of chil-
dren: number of children below age 18 in the household. Hours worked:
weekly number of hours worked. Standard deviations are in paren-
theses.
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